josh blog
Ordinary language is all right.
One could divide humanity into two classes:
those who master a metaphor, and those who hold by a formula.
Those with a bent for both are too few, they do not comprise a class.
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Thinking of joining a social network again so I can fill in the religion box on their profile form w/ 'Marquee Moon'.
—The interrupted new material in the 80s is complemented by material awkward in its own way at §§134–142. And doubt is again a theme in §142: 'It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly laid out in advance for us; we know, are in no doubt, what we have to say in this or that case…'. Then, from §143 on, we're off: series continuation, 'reading', rule-following, private language, the diarist…
Why the interruption? Not just a side trip to lodge some criticism of the Tractatus (criticism of unclear substance, at that). To make direct contact with skepticism, with the existence or removal of doubt, Wittgenstein has to be in the vicinity of ideas about assertion, truth. But, curiously, these ideas track passages from the Tractatus about 'logic and its application' (just after, significantly, 'Alle Sätze unserer Umgangssprache sind tatsächlich, so wie sie sind, logisch vollkommen geordnet…', 5.5563):
5.557: 'Die Logik darf mit ihrer Anwendung nicht kollidieren.'
§141: 'Können nun Bild und Anwendung kollidieren? Nun, sie können kollidieren, als uns das Bild eine andere Verwendung erwarten läßt; weil die Menschen im allgemeinen von diesem Bild diese Anwendung machen.'
There were some references before (e.g. §87c) to normality, but it seems like this bit from §141 twists things decisively in that direction—makes the right terms available.
And acknowledging the possibility of conflicting applications seems like it has to be part of that.