Ordinary language is all right.
One could divide humanity into two classes:
those who master a metaphor, and those who hold by a formula.
Those with a bent for both are too few, they do not comprise a class.
Heidegger's hermeneutic is top-down, Cavell's, ground-up.
We read the weather as volatile, time as fleeting, when we should just as often note the obdurate stasis of clouded days and constant temperatures, the inert bulk of times, skies, which need hardly a week to make us feel that things have always been this way, that this is how it is.
We recall the sun and recall our nights on different occasions, in different circumstances.
Could modernism have failed to catch on (to whatever extent it did in the various arts) in philosophy for as dumb a reason as philosophy's already thinking it had a 'modern' in the early modern revival of philosophy, and its occupying itself constantly ever since with a task of 'making it new' (i.e., sustaining or overthrowing that revival)?
(Plus all the internal reasons like, guh.)